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We present a new approach to simulate quantum cryptography protocols using event-based pro-
cesses. The method is validated by simulating the BB84 protocol and the Ekert protocol, both
without and with the presence of an eavesdropper.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is an artifice of exchanging information
between two parties such that an unauthorized person
cannot retrieve this information. To this end, the sender
usually employs some key to encrypt the information to
be transmitted, and the receiver applies a decryption al-
gorithm to recover the original information. If the cryp-
tographic system is secure, an eavesdropper can decipher
the encrypted message if and only if the eavesdropper
knows the key. Thus, the central problem of cryptog-
raphy is to establish a powerful key. We may imagine
that the more bits the key contains and the more com-
plicated the key is, the more secure the process is. But,
in practice, if the key is generated and transmitted in a
conventional, electronic way, it may be possible to inter-
cept the key. Then, the eavesdropper can make a copy of
the exchanged information without changing it, such that
the sender or receiver did not notice that the information
has been intercepted.
Quantum cryptography uses microscopic objects such
as individual photons as information carriers1. One of
the characteristic features of such microscopic systems is
that a measurement may change the information that the
microscopic system carries. Therefore, if an eavesdropper
attempts to make a measurement to determine a bit of
the key, there is no guarantee that the information car-
ried by the microscopic system is left unchanged. If the
quantum cryptography protocol is designed properly, the
presence of the eavesdropper is revealed by an increase
of the error rate in the bits that are being transmitted
from sender to receiver.
Although there is no doubt that quantum theory is
very successful in describing a vast number of experi-
mental results, it is well-known that quantum theory has
nothing to say about individual events that are being
recorded in experiments2,3. Yet, quantum cryptography
uses individual events to transmit information, its secu-
rity being guaranteed by axioms. Since the inception of
quantum theory, the major fundamental problem of in-
corporating in quantum theory the fact that we observe
events only is often referred to as the quantum measure-
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ment paradox and has not yet found a solution within the
realm of quantum theory2. Therefore, it seems worth-
while the study the fundamental question what it is that
makes quantum cryptography work: Logically speaking,
it cannot be quantum mechanics because quantum me-
chanics has nothing to say about individual events2,3.
In a number of recent papers4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11, we have
demonstrated that locally-connected networks of process-
ing units can simulate, event-by-event, the single-photon
beam splitter, Mach-Zehnder interferometer experiments
of Grangier et al.12, and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen exper-
iments with photons13,14. Furthermore, we have shown
that this approach can be generalized to simulate univer-
sal quantum computation15 by an event-by-event pro-
cess5,7. Therefore, this suggests that at least in prin-
ciple, it may be possible to simulate all wave interfer-
ence phenomena and many-body quantum systems using
particle-like processes only. In this paper, we extend this
approach to quantum cryptography systems.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sections II and
III, we briefly review the two most popular protocols of
quantum cryptography: the BB84 protocol16,17,18 and
Ekert’s protocol19. Although both protocols are closely
related1, from the point of view of simulation algorithm,
the latter is considerably more complicated than the for-
mer, which is the main reason for discussing both of
them. The simulation algorithms for the polarizer are
presented in Section IV. Simulation results for the BB84
and the Ekert protocol, both with and without eaves-
dropper, are given in Sections V and VI. Although our
simulation method does not rely on any concept of quan-
tum theory, it is nevertheless capable of simulating quan-
tum cryptography protocols on the event-by-event level.
Therefore, it may shine light on the question what is
essential for quantum cryptography to work. In Sec-
tion VD, we discuss this issue. The results of this paper
are summarized in Section VII.
II. BB84 PROTOCOL
In 1989, an experimental prototype that imple-
mented the quantum cryptography protocol BB8416,17,18,
demonstrated that it is possible to transmit an encryp-
tion key using the polarization state of single photons.
In this section, we briefly review the idea behind this
2TABLE I: Summary of the BB84 protocol. The first column shows the bit that Alice wants to encode and send to Bob. The
second and third columns give the orientations of Alice’s and Bob’s polarizers, respectively. The fourth and fifth columns are
the probabilities that Bob detects a photon in the output channel 0 and 1 of his polarizer. The last column gives the bit that
Bob obtains from his measurement. The question mark indicates that the probability that Bob makes the wrong guess is 50%.
Alice’s bit φA φB
P0
cos2(φA − φB)
P1
sin2(φA − φB)
Bob’s bit
0 00 00 1 0 0
450 1/2 1/2 ?
0 450 00 1/2 1/2 ?
450 1 0 0
1 900 00 0 1 1
450 1/2 1/2 ?
1 1350 00 1/2 1/2 ?
450 0 1 1
protocol.
The BB84 protocol employs the polarization state of
photons as the information carrier. As each detection of
a single photon yields one out of two definite answers for
the polarization of the photon, these observations can be
described by the quantum theory of a two-state system.
The BB84 protocol uses two sets of non-orthogonal co-
ordinate systems, which are the usual x-y (rectilinear)
basis and the diagonal basis which is the rectilinear basis
rotated by 45◦. In the rectilinear basis, the photon can
be either in the horizontal (−→) or in the vertical (↑) po-
larization state. In the diagonal linear basis, the photon
can be either in the diagonal (ր) or in the anti-diagonal
(տ) polarization state.
Let Alice and Bob be the two parties who want to ex-
change a secret key. Alice generates and sends Bob a
sequence of photons with polarization states that are se-
lected randomly from the four possible directions: 00(−→
), 450(ր), 900(↑) and 1350(տ). The bits of Alice are en-
coded from these directions in the following way: 00 and
450 represent bit 0, 900 and 1350 represent bit 1. When
a photon arrives at Bob’s observation station, Bob per-
forms a measurement on this photon based on a randomly
selected basis, either the rectilinear or the diagonal ba-
sis. Bob encodes the outcome of his measurements in the
same way as Alice does. If Bob chooses a basis which is
consistent with Alice selection (for instance, Alice’s sends
a photon polarized in 00 or 900, and Bob performs the
measurement on the rectilinear basis), then it is assumed
that Bob’s bit is identical to that of Alice. Otherwise Bob
will guess the wrong bit for about 50% of the detected
photons. Table I lists the various possibilities that Al-
ice and Bob may encounter during the exchange of data.
It should be clear from this discussion that up to this
point, it has been assumed that the detectors operate
with 100% detection efficiency, that the coordinate sys-
tems of Alice and Bob are perfectly aligned and so on,
that is we assume that the experiment is perfect.
After recording a collection of events, in the next step,
Alice and Bob will sift the key from the original raw bits
by communicating through a conventional classical chan-
nel. For each photon that Bob has received, he tells Alice
which basis he has selected but he does not tell her the
result of the measurement. Then, for each photon, Al-
ice announces to Bob whether he made a correct choice.
Finally they discard all the bits for which Bob has made
the wrong choice of basis. The bits that survive the sift-
ing procedure constitute the key and be used to encrypt
the data that they want to send to each other.
An eavesdropper, conventionally called Eve, who at-
tempts to intercept some photons during the key trans-
mission process will cause some errors in the sifted key,
and these errors can be detected by Alice and Bob
through publicly comparing randomly selected subsets
of their sifted key. If Eve performs the similar measure-
ments as Bob on all photons sent by Alice, and then
prepares and resents new photons according to her mea-
surements, Alice and Bob will observe an error rate of
about 25% and conclude that their communication chan-
nel is not secure.
III. EKERT’S PROTOCOL
In 1991, Artur Ekert proposed another protocol based
on entanglement states with security guaranteed by Bell
inequalities19. The source can be any two-particle system
with some property entangled. In the original proposal
of the protocol, pairs of spin- 12 particles in a singlet state
are used as the information carrier, but in the real experi-
ments20,21, polarization entangled photon pairs are most
commonly used to implement this protocol. In Ref.21,
the CHSH inequality (one of the many forms of a Bell
inequality) is used to test of the security. In Ref.20 an-
other form of Bell inequality, the Wigner inequality22,
provides a relative simple test of the security. In this
3TABLE II: The quantum theoretical predictions for the single- and two particle probabilities of a system in the singlet state and
in the product state. The upper part shows the probability of observing + on one side and the joined probability of observing
+ on both sides. The lower part gives the expressions for the Wigner parameter S and the modified Wigner parameter S′.
Singlet state Product state
P+(φA)
1
2
cos2 (ψ
A
−φA)
P+(φB)
1
2
cos2 (ψ
B
−φ
B
)
P++(φA, φB)
1
2
sin2 (φ
A
−φB) cos
2 (ψ
A
−φA) cos
2 (ψ
B
−φB)
S sin2 θ− 1
2
sin2 2θ
cos2 ψA cos
2 (ψ
B
−θ)+ cos2 (ψ
A
+θ) cos2 ψB−
cos2 (ψ
A
+θ) cos2 (ψ
B
−θ)
S′ sin2 θ− 1
2
sin2 2θ
cos2 ψA cos
2 (ψ
B
−θ)+ cos2 (ψ
A
+θ) cos2 ψB+
sin2ψA sin
2 ψB− cos
2 (ψ
A
+θ) cos2 (ψ
B
−θ)
section, we briefly review the main idea of this protocol.
First, it is assumed that there is a source that emits
pairs of photons, one photon traveling to Alice and the
other photon traveling to Bob. It is assumed that the
state of the whole system, that is the description of the
observation of the polarization of many pairs, can be de-
scribed by the singlet state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉A|V 〉B − |V 〉A|H〉B), (1)
whereH and V denote the horizontal and vertical (linear)
polarization states. When a pair of photons A and B has
been generated at the source, they are spatially separated
and sent to Alice and Bob through free air or through
some special optical fiber. Then Alice and Bob perform
measurements on the polarization state of the received
photon using a polarizing beamsplitter. Both Alice and
Bob independently and randomly select between two po-
larization orientations. Let us denote the two orienta-
tions of Alice by φA1 and φA2 , and those of Bob by φB1
and φB2 . The outcome for an individual measurement
is represented by either +1 or −1. Because of the as-
sumed entanglement between the polarization of the two
photons, if Alice and Bob select parallel but otherwise
arbitrary orientations of their polarizer, the outcomes of
these two measurements are expected to display perfect
anticorrelation. Thus, anticorrelation between the two
measurements with φA1 = φB1 can be used to establish
the key.
When the two photons of a particular pair are mea-
sured in two non-parallel orientations, the correlation be-
tween them cannot be recognized as such. Then, we need
a test to see if the correlation are those of a system in
the singlet state. The Wigner inequality provides a con-
venient tool to do this. We denote by P++(φA1 , φB2),
P++(φA2 , φB1), and P++(φA2 , φB2) the probabilities to
obtain +1 on both sides for these three pairs of different
orientations of the polarizers. Under the assumptions
discussed in Appendix A these three probabilities must
obey Wigner inequality
P++(φA,1, φB,2)+P++(φA,2, φB,1)−P++(φA,2, φB,2) ≥ 0.
(2)
In Appendix A, we give a simple proof of the Wigner
inequality. For later use, it is expedient to define the
Wigner parameter by
S = P++(φA,1, φB,2)+P++(φA,2, φB,1)−P++(φA,2, φB,2)
(3)
For the singlet state Eq. (1), quantum theory predicts
that
P++(φA,1, φB,1) =
1
2
sin2(φA,1 − φB,1). (4)
Inserting Eq. (4) into Eq. (2), it is easy to check (see later
for examples) that for some a range of φA,1, φB,2, φA,2,
and φB,2, we have S < 0. Hence the Wigner inequality
Eq. (2) is violated by a quantum system in the singlet
state. For a particular choice of orientations that is used
to implement Ekert’s protocol namely φA,1 = φB,1 = 0,
φA,2 = 30
0, and φB,2 = −300, we find that S = −1/8.
Any attempt to tamper with the singlet state will change
S from its minimum value −1/8 to a larger one.
What happens to the observed data when photons are
intercepted and resend? Is the Wiger inequality still pow-
erful enough to reveal the insecurity of the whole system?
It turns out that the assumption of perfect anticorrela-
tion, essential for the derivation of Wigner inequality,
may cause a security problem. To alleviate this problem,
a modified Wigner inequality that does not rely on the
assumption of perfect anticorrelation was introduced in
Ref.23. An experimental test of the power of the modi-
fied Wigner inequality in the presence of eavesdropping is
given in Ref.24. A simple proof of this Modified Wigner
inequality is given in Appendix B. Introducing the mod-
ified Wigner parameter S′ by
S′ = P++(φA,1, φB,2) + P++(φA,2, φB,1)
+ P−−(φA,1, φB,1)− P++(φA,2, φB,2), (5)
the modified Wigner inequality reads
S′ ≥ 0. (6)
4Compared to the original Wigner inequality, an extra
term is added which contributes when both Alice and
Bob choose the same orientation of their polarizers. This
extra term significantly increases the possibility of de-
tecting the presence of an eavesdropper.
For the simulation of this protocol in the presence
of eavesdropping, we assume that Eve performs the
intercept-resend strategy. This implies that Eve detects
the two photons using two polarizers with orientations
ψA and ψB, respectively, and then uses the result of her
measurement of the two photons to prepare a photon that
she sends to Alice and another photon that she sends to
Bob. According to quantum theory, the photons received
by both Alice and Bob are described by the product state
|Ψ〉 = (cosψA|H〉A + sinψA|V 〉A)
×(cosψB|H〉B − sinψB|V 〉B). (7)
The predictions of quantum theory for the product state
and the singlet state are summarized in Table II.
In Table II, φA and φB denote the orientations of Al-
ice’s and Bob’s polarizer, respectively, P+(φA) represents
the probability that Alice obtains +1 in her measure-
ment, P+(φB) denotes the corresponding probability for
Bob’s measurement, and P++(φA, φB) refers to the prob-
ability that both Alice and Bob record a +1 result. In the
last two rows of Table II we list the results of quantum
theory for the original and the modified Wigner parame-
ter for the polarizer settings φA,1 = φB,1 = 0, φA,2 = −θ,
and φB,2 = θ. For the singlet state, the additional term
in the modified Wigner parameter is zero. Hence there is
no difference between S and S′ and both of them only de-
pend on θ. However in the case of a product state, the ad-
ditional term sin2ψA sin
2 ψB that depends on the polar-
ization states of the photons and is always non-negative,
hence S′ ≥ S. Thus, if Alice and Bob expect to ob-
serve the singlet state they should find S′ = S = −1/8.
However, if Eve is intercepting and sending photons in a
product state, the modified Wigner inequality provides
more power to disclose the existence of an eavesdropper
because Eve’s actions will cause S′ to change from being
negative to positive while S may remain negative (see the
examples shown later).
IV. EVENT-BASED SIMULATION OF A
POLARIZER
Both the practical realization of the BB84 and the Ek-
ert protocol use the detection of the photon polariza-
tion. Hence, the polarizer is an indispensable apparatus
for both Alice and Bob to perform their measurements.
Therefore, to set up an event-by-event computer simu-
lation model for these quantum cryptography protocols,
we first need to consider event-based simulation models
for a polarizer.
Some optically active materials such as calcite split
an incoming beam of light into two spatially separated
beams depending on the polarization property of the in-
cident beam25. If the incident beam has polarization ψ
and the orientation of the polarizer is denoted by φ, the
intensities of the two output beams 0 and 1 are given by
Malus’ law
I0 = cos
2(ψ − φ),
I1 = sin
2(ψ − φ). (8)
The polarization of output beam 0 is φ, and the polar-
ization of output beam 1 is φ+ pi/2. The incident beam
is said to be randomly polarized if I0 = I1 = 1/2.
The simplest simulation model of a polarizer deter-
mines the type (0 or 1) of the output by comparing a
uniform pseudo-random number r with cos2(ψ − φ). If
r ≤ cos2(ψ−φ), the output is of type 0, otherwise it is of
type 1. For each individual input photon, the outcome
is pseudo-random, but if we repeat this process for suf-
ficiently many events (and the pseudo-random number
generator is of sufficient quality), the frequencies of ob-
serving photons in output 0 and 1 will agree with Malus’
law. In the sequel, this model for the polarizer will be
called the probabilistic polarizer (PP).
As an alternative for the PP, we will also simulate
both protocols using a deterministic model for the polar-
izer4,5,6,7,26. This model will be called the deterministic
polarizer (DP). As the details of this model are not of
importance for (the analysis of) the results presented in
this paper, we refer the reader who is interested in this
and other deterministic simulation models for quantum
phenomena to Refs. 4,5,6,7,26. In this paper, we show
that both the PP and DP models are capable of repro-
ducing exactly all the results of quantum theory for both
the BB84 and the Ekert protocol using an event-by-event
based simulation algorithm.
V. EVENT-BASED SIMULATION OF THE BB84
PROTOCOL
In this section, we present the results of an event-by-
event simulation of the BB84 protocol using both PPs
and DPs. We start with the original BB84 protocol and
demonstrate that the sifted bits obtained by Alice and
Bob are identical, as expected. Then, we simulate the
effect of eavesdropping by Eve who uses the intercept-
resend strategy and show that this introduces significant
errors in the sifted key. Finally, we study the effect of
misalignment of the settings of both Alice’s and Bob’s
polarizers by computing the fidelity of the sifted key as
a function of the misalignment angles.
A. Simulation of the BB84 protocol in the absence
of an eavesdropper
Two polarizers are needed to simulate this protocol,
one for Alice, and another one for Bob. Alice uses her
5TABLE III: The first 100 bits of the sifted key of the BB84 protocol without eavesdropping. The upper part gives bits 0 – 50,
the lower part gives bits 51 – 100. As expected, the sifted key of Alice is identical to the one obtained by Bob.
Alice’s bits 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Bob’s bits 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Alice’s bits 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Bob’s bits 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
TABLE IV: The first 100 bits of the sifted key of the BB84 protocol in the presence of eavesdropping. The upper part gives bits
0 – 50, the lower part gives bits 51 – 100. The differences between Alices’s and Bob’s sifted key are emphasized by underlining
the bits. The error rate is about 26%.
Alice’s bits 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
Bob’s bits 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
Alice’s bits 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Bob’s bits 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
polarizer to encode the bits she wants to send by (ran-
domly) selecting the polarization 0◦(−→), 45◦(ր), 90◦(↑)
or 135◦(տ). Thus, if Alice wants to encode a random
sequence of bits, Alice’s polarizer φA chooses randomly
from these four directions. In the simulation, we use
uniform pseudo-random numbers to select the polariza-
tions, implying that half of the photons leave the polar-
izer through output channel 0 while the others leave the
polarizer through output channel 1. The photons leaving
through channel 1 are discarded and all the other photons
are sent to Bob. The orientation φB of Bob’s polarizer
switches randomly between 00(−→) and 450(ր). These
two directions define Bob’s two measurement basis, the
rectilinear or diagonal linear basis.
As indicated in Table I, the probabilities to observe a
photon in output channel 0 and 1 are cos2(φA−φB) and
sin2(φA − φB), respectively. It is clear from Table I that
the cases for which Bob has a definite outcome corre-
spond to situation in which Bob selected an observation
basis that is consistent with the choice made by Alice.
In Table III, we show the first 100 bits of the sifted
sequence, extracted from a simulation sequence of 105
events. After passing through Alice’s polarizer, the num-
ber of the photons sent to Bob is 49920 (approximately
1/2 of the total number of events), and the length of the
sifted key is 25072 (approximately 1/4 of the total num-
ber of events). From Table III, we see that the first 100
bits of the sifted key that Alice and Bob obtain are iden-
tical, as expected. We have checked that the other bits
in the sifted key are identical also (results not shown).
Furthermore, the simulation results for the sifted key do
not depend the choice of the simulation model (PP or
DP) for the polarizer (results not shown). The fidelity
F , defined as the ratio of the correct bits in the sifted
key to the length of the sifted key is 100%.
B. Simulation of the BB84 protocol in the presence
of an eavesdropper
The presence of Eve is built into the simulation al-
gorithm by adding a polarizer and implementing the
intercept-resend strategy. Thereby, we assume that Eve
intercepts all the photons that Alice sends to Bob and
that she is able to perform the measurements in the same
rectilinear or diagonal linear basis as the ones used by
Bob. It is easy to see that for this type of eavesdropping,
the error rate in the sifted key should be about 25%. In
Table IV, we show the first 100 bits of the sifted sequence,
extracted from a simulation sequence of 105 events. The
number of the photons that Bob receives is 50074 (ap-
proximately 1/2 of the total number of events), and the
length of the sifted key is 25043 (approximately 1/4 of
the total number of events). In this case, the fidelity is
about 75.2%. As in the case without eavesdropper, the
simulation results for the sifted key do not depend on
the choice of the simulation model (PP or DP) for the
polarizer (results not shown).
C. Misalignment of the measurement basis
In this section, we consider a situation in which there is
a misalignment of the measurement basis of both parties.
In real experiments, it is unlikely that, say the rec-
tilinear basis used by Alice is perfectly aligned with the
rectilinear basis used by Bob. Furthermore, in real exper-
iments the polarization of the photons changes as they
propagate through the medium because of interactions
with the medium (air, fibers). Moreover, for some strate-
gies, the results of eavesdropping can be viewed as a ro-
60
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FIG. 1: The fidelity F of the sifted key as a function of mis-
alignment θtilt. Solid circles (green): Simulation data using
the PP model. Open circles (red): Simulation data using the
DP model. Dashed line (blue): Theoretical prediction given
by Eq. (9).
tation of Bob’s measurement basis, making it more dif-
ficult to distinguish between a real misalignment of the
basis and the presence of an eavesdropper. Thus, it is
important to study the effects of misalignments of the
coordinate systems.
In our simulations, we use the orientations of Alice’s
polarizer as reference and tilt Bob’s basis by an angle
θtilt. Therefore Bob’s basis changes to from 0
◦ to 0◦ +
θtilt and from 45
◦ to 45◦ + θtilt. In Fig. 1, we show our
simulation results for the fidelity as a function of θtilt.
Unlike in the two previous cases, the simulation re-
sults for the sifted key depend on the choice of the sim-
ulation model (PP or DP) for the polarizer. For the
PP model, the simulation data (solid circles in Fig. 1)
is in good agreement with experimental results27,28. For
this model, we may compute the averaged fidelity by av-
eraging (according to Malus’ law) the probabilities for
obtaining identical bits in the sifted keys. We find
FPP = cos
2 θtilt. (9)
This function is shown as the dashed line in Fig. 1,
demonstrating that there is excellent agreement between
theory and simulation. The open circles in Fig. 1 are the
simulation data as obtained with the DP model. Clearly,
the sifted keys obtained by using the DP model are much
more robust with respect to misalignments of the polar-
izers than the ones obtained by using the PP model. On
the other hand, the DP results do not agree with cur-
rently available experimental results27,28, suggesting that
the polarizers that are used in these experiments are not
described by the DP model.
D. Discussion
Clearly, our simulation algorithm for the BB84 does
not solve an equation of quantum theory nor does it rely
on concepts of quantum theory. This should not come
as a surprise: As quantum theory does not describe in-
dividual events (the quantum measurement paradox)2,3,
there is no reason to expect that quantum theory has
any bearing on quantum cryptography, other than that
it describes the averages over many events. As this point
of view is in conflict with popular statements that quan-
tum cryptography requires a full quantum mechanical
description1 or that quantum cryptography relies on the
Heisenberg uncertainty relation, it is of interest to con-
sider the question at which point concepts of quantum
physics enter into our event-by-event simulation of the
BB84 protocol.
From the description of the simulation algorithm, it is
clear that in order for the BB84 to be secure, it is essen-
tial that the message and messenger have the following
properties:
1. A message can be one out of two pairs of possible
items only.
2. The messenger tells the recipient which of the two
pairs the item that the messenger carries belongs
to, but the messenger cannot tell a recipient which
item it is.
3. The messenger can deliver the message only once
and after delivering the message, the messenger
self-destructs.
It is not too difficult to build a macroscopic device with
these properties (minor modifications to intelligent con-
tainers used for transport of valuables and cash would
do). Imagine that Alice has a set of boxes (the messen-
gers) with the following properties:
1. Once closed, the box explodes when it is being tam-
pered with. The box is shielded such that when
it detects penetrating radiation, it explodes, mak-
ing it impossible to analyze its content without de-
stroying the content. Note that for secure quantum
cryptography, similar conditions apply to Alice’s
and Bob’s station too1.
2. As long as the box is open, Alice can wire the elec-
tronics inside the box such that the electronic cir-
cuit encodes one of the four possibilities according
to Table I. After wiring her bit, she closes the box
and sends it to Bob.
3. On the outside, the box has a button and a switch,
the setting of which corresponds to Bob’s choice
of the orientation of his measurements basis (see
Table I). Bob puts the switch in one of its two
positions and then he presses the button. The elec-
tronics inside the box, causes the box to explode
immediately, after five seconds or after ten seconds,
corresponding to the case where Bob detects a 0,
?, or 1, respectively (see Table I).
7It is not difficult to see that this classical, macroscopic
device is no less vulnerable to eavesdroppers than the
quantum cryptography system. Of course, the latter is
much more user-friendly and less expensive to operate.
VI. EVENT-BASED SIMULATION OF THE
EKERT PROTOCOL
Starting from the observation that coincidence in time
is a key ingredient in experimental realizations of the
EPR gedanken experiment, several computer simulation
algorithms have been proposed that (1) satisfy Einstein’s
conditions of local causality and realism and (2) exactly
reproduce the two-particle correlation that is character-
istic for a quantum system in the singlet state8,9,10,11.
These algorithms generate the data event-by-event, use
integer arithmetic and elementary mathematics to ana-
lyze the data, and do not rely on concepts of probability
theory or quantum theory.
In this Section, we use these algorithms to perform an
even-by-event simulation of Ekert’s quantum cryptogra-
phy protocol. For the sake of brevity, we do not review
all the details of the algorithms. The reader who is in-
terested in these aspects should consult the original pa-
pers8,9,10,11. The rigorous, probabilistic treatment given
in Appendix C proves that our classical simulation model
reproduces the correlations that are characteristic for a
quantum system in the singlet state.
A. Simulation of the Ekert protocol in the absence
of an eavesdropper
A schematic diagram of the simulation procedure is
shown in Fig. 2. In the simulation algorithm, the source
generates pairs of particles (photons in the real exper-
iment). Particle A and B travel to Alice and Bob, re-
spectively. Each particle carries a two-dimensional unit
vector given by
Sn,1 = (cosψn, sinψn),
Sn,2 = (− sinψn, cosψn). (10)
where n labels the number of the event. The vectors
Sn,1 and Sn,2 represent the polarizations ψn and ψn +
pi
2
of the two photons that fly to Alice and Bob, respectively.
The distribution of ψn is taken to be uniform over the
interval [0, 2pi]. Note that after projecting the vectors
Sn,1 and Sn,2 onto dichotomic variables, the latter satisfy
the conditions for deriving the Wigner inequality (see
Appendix A).
When the particle arrives at Alice’s (Bob’s) station, la-
beled by i = 1 (i = 2), a random number is used to select
the polarizer that will be used to perform the polarization
measurement on the photon. This measurement maps
the angle ψn onto the variable xn,i = xn,i(ψn, An,i) =
±1. Thus, the results of generating N of these events
can be summarized by
Γn,i = {xn,i = ±1, An,i = ±1|n = 1, ..., N}, (11)
where An,i denotes which of the polarizers has been se-
lected. It is clear that we have assumed that the value of
xn,i depends on the incoming polarization and the inter-
nal orientation of the selected polarizer only.
In any real experiment, one needs a criterion to decide
whether two objects form a single two-particle system or
whether they may be considered as two single-particle
systems. EPR experiments are no exception to this13,14.
EPR experiments with photons use coincidence in time
to identify a single pair of two photons. Note that time
coincidences play an essential role in real quantum cryp-
tography experiments1.
In practice, Alice and Bob add time tags to their detec-
tion events in order to be able to count coincidences. As
the optical components (polarizers) induce time delays,
it is reasonable for a particle to experience a time delay
when it passes through the detection system. To mimic
this, we introduce the time delay into our simulation al-
gorithm8,9,10,11. At each station, we generate a time tag
that depends on the local settings only. Then, we com-
pare the difference between the two time tags with a cer-
tain time window W . If this difference is smaller than
W , the detection events are considered to be coincident.
Otherwise, they are discarded.
We assume that the maximum time delay Tn,i for a
particle passing through a polarizer depends only on the
angle difference between the polarization of the incident
particle and the internal orientation of the polarizer. For
instance, on Alice’s side, we set Tn,1 = Tn,1(ψn − φA,i).
The time tag tn,i itself is taken to be a pseudo-random
number from the interval [0, Tn,1]
8,9,10,11. Summarizing,
the simulation algorithm generates two data sets
Υn,i = {xn,i = ±1, An,i = ±1, tn,i|n = 1, ..., N}, (12)
for i = 1 (Alice) and i = 2 (Bob). The structure of these
data sets is identical to the data sets collected in EPR
experiments with photons13,14.
From Ref.8,9,10,11, we know that the simulation model
can reproduce all the results of quantum theory of a sys-
tem of two S = 1/2 particles if we take Tn,1(θ) = |sin 2θ|d
(note that we have chosen the maximum time delay as
the unit of time). Here d is a free parameter, which we
call the time-delay parameter. If d = 0, we have Tn,i = 1,
implying that the maximum time delay does not depend
on the relative orientation. In this case, the time delay
has no essential influence on the final results8,9,10,11. In
our simulation (and also in experiment13), we first fix
the time-tag resolution, denoted by 0 < τ < 1. Then, in
our simulations, the time window is defined by W = kτ ,
where k is an integer. It is clear that τ effectively deter-
mines the resolution by which we can resolve differences
in the angles. After generating N pairs and collecting the
data Eq. (12), we count the coincidences and we obtain
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FIG. 2: Schematic diagram of the event-by-event simulation of Ekert’s quantum cryptography protocol, using the (modified)
Wigner inequality as a guard against eavesdroppers. The source emits pairs of particles with orthogonal but random polariza-
tion. The particles fly to Alice’s and Bob’s observation station, respectively. The rectangular boxes labeled by R direct the
particles to one of the two polarizers, using a binary pseudo-random number. When the particle emerges from a polarizer it
generates a +1 or −1 event, and a clock is used to attach a time tag to this event. After collecting all events, Alice and Bob
use time coincidence to correlate their data and to extract the key.
an estimate for the probability
P++(φA, φB) =
C++
C++ + C−− + C+− + C−+
, (13)
where Cxy ≡ Cxy(φA, φB) denotes the number of coin-
cidences between the signal x = ±1 at station 1 and a
signal y = ±1 at station 2 for a fixed combination of φA
and φB and is given by
Cxy =
N∑
n=1
δx,xn,1δy,xn,2Θ(W − |tn,1 − tn,2|). (14)
From Eq. (13) we compute the Wigner parameter S ac-
cording to Eq. (3).
We first show simulation results obtained by using
the DP model. In Fig. 3, we plot the probability
P++(φA, φB) for fixed φA = 0 and 0 ≤ φB ≤ 2pi. The
values of the other parameters used in the simulation are
k = 1, d = 2, τ = 0.00025, and N = 108. The dashed line
in Fig. 3 is the quantum theoretical prediction Eq. (4).
From Fig. 3, we conclude that there is an excellent agree-
ment between the simulation data and quantum theory.
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FIG. 3: P++(φA, φB) as a function of |φA−φB|. Solid circles
(red): Simulation data obtained by using the DP model with
d = 2. Dashed line (blue): Quantum theory (Eq. (4)).
For comparison, in Fig. 4 we present the simulation
results for d = 0 and d = 4. For d = 0, the two time
tags that we generated are just two independent uniform
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FIG. 4: P++(φA, φB) as a function of |φA−φB|. Open circles
(red): Simulation data by using the DP model with d = 0.
Solid circles (green): Simulation data obtained by using the
DP model with d = 4. Dashed line (blue): Quantum theory
(Eq. (4)).
pseudo-random numbers between 0 and 1 and contain
no information about the polarizations of the incident
photons or the orientations of the polarizers. Therefore,
because of the procedure to count coincidences, the size
of the window can only influence the numbers of events
we collect: W affects the statistical fluctuations only.
As a check, we have taken a fairly large time window
(W = 100τ) and found that in this case, the distribution
P++(φA, φB) is very close to the distribution that we
find if we accept all the events (no coincidence window).
For d = 4, we see from Fig. 4 that the correlations are
“stronger” than those of the quantum system8,9,10,11.
Next, we consider the Wigner parameter S for the fixed
relation of the four orientations mentioned above: φA,1 =
φB,1 = ϕ, φA,2 = ϕ − θ, φB,2 = ϕ + θ. Inserting these
special values into Eq. (3) we get
S(θ) = sin2 θ − 1
2
sin2 2θ. (15)
Since in this case, the Wigner parameter depends on θ
only, it is sufficient to consider the case ϕ = 0.
The simulation results are plotted in Fig.5. The val-
ues of the parameters used in the simulation are k = 1,
d = 2, τ = 0.00025, and N = 108. Again, we see an ex-
cellent agreement between the simulation data and quan-
tum theory. Furthermore, from Fig.5 it is clear that the
maximum violation of Wigner inequality is reached at
θ = 300. Therefore, in the Ekert protocol, the orienta-
tions of both parties are chosen to be φA,1 = φB,1 = 0
0,
φA,2 = 30
0, φB,2 = −300. Then, the violation of the
Wigner inequality signals the strong anti-correlation of
the pairs and the Wigner parameter S can be used to
quantify the security of the protocol.
For completeness, we show in Fig. 6 the results for the
Wigner parameter for the cases d = 0 and d = 4. As
discussed above, d = 0 corresponds to the case for which
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FIG. 5: The Wigner parameter S as a function of θ. Solid
circles (red): Simulation data obtained by using the DPmodel
with d = 2. Dashed line (blue): Quantum theory (Eq. (3)).
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FIG. 6: The Wigner parameter S as a function of θ. Open
circles (red): Simulation data obtained by using the DPmodel
with d = 0. Solid circles (green): Simulation data obtained
by using the DP model with d = 4. Solid line (red): Quantum
theory (Eq. (3)).
correlations are computed without taking the time-tag in-
formation into account, showing ”classical” correlations.
For d = 4, the correlation is stronger than the one of
the quantum system, hence the violation of the Wigner
inequality can be larger.
Having established that our simulation algorithm re-
produces the results of quantum theory of a single sys-
tem of two polarizations, we now use the algorithm to
simulate Ekert’s quantum cryptography protocol.
As discussed earlier, the anticorrelated bits are gener-
ated using a parallel basis (that is, the basis selected by
both parties is φA,1 = φB,1 = 0
0). After inverting all the
bits from one of the two parties, we expect to obtain two
identical sequences. The first 100 bits from a long sim-
ulation are shown in Table V. In this simulation, which
uses the DP model, we observe an almost perfect anticor-
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TABLE V: The first 100 bits of the sifted key of Ekert’s protocol without eavesdropping, as obtained by using the DP model.
The upper part gives bits 0 – 50, the lower part gives bits 51 – 100. In this case, there are no errors in this part of the sifted
key (the error rate is very low (10−5)).
Alice’s bits 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Bob’s bits 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Alice’s bits 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Bob’s bits 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
TABLE VI: The first 100 bits of the sifted key of the Ekert protocol without eavesdropping, as obtained by using the PP
model. The upper part gives bits 0 – 50, the lower part gives bits 51 – 100. The differences between Alices’s and Bob’s sifted
key are emphasized by underlining the bits. There are only 2 errors in this part of the sequence.
Alice’s bits 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
Bob’s bits 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
Alice’s bits 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Bob’s bits 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
relation of the two photons. Indeed, if φA,1 = φB,1 = 0
0,
the relative error in the key is of the order of 10−5.
Finally, we simulate this protocol by using the PP
model. It is known that in order to reproduce the correct
quantum correlations, we must take d = 410,11. Except
for the value of d, we take the same simulation parameters
as in the DP-model simulations and repeat the calcula-
tion. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 7.
After inverting all the bits from one of the two par-
ties, we obtain two sequences of bit strings, the first 100
bits being shown in Table VI. The error rate in this sim-
ulation is of the order of 10−2. That this error rate is
larger than in the DP simulation is easy to understand:
If we use the PP model, the outcome of each individual
measurement is inherently (pseudo-) random instead of
deterministic as in the case of the DP model.
B. Simulation of the Ekert protocol in the presence
of an eavesdropper
In the previous subsection, we have demonstrated that
by using the perfectly anticorrelated source, together
with the time-tag model and a time window to count
coincidences, we can reproduce the correlation that is
characteristic for a quantum system in the singlet state.
In this subsection, we simulate the situation in which an
eavesdropper is present
First, we consider the special case in which Eve uses
two polarizers with fixed, perpendicular orientations:
ψA = 45
0 and ψB = 135
0. We should imagine that
Eve can put these polarizers on both sides of the source.
Hence, she can manipulate the polarization that Alice
and Bob will observe in their measurements.
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FIG. 7: The Wigner parameter S as a function of θ. Solid
circles (green): Simulation data obtained by using the PP
model with d = 4. Open circles (red): Simulation data ob-
tained by using the PP model with d = 0. Dashed line (blue):
Quantum theoretical result for S (see Table II); Dashed line
(black): Analytical results for S and d = 0 (see Appendix C).
Our simulation model can easily deal with this compli-
cation: We just put two PPs (or DPs) between the source
and Alice and the source and Bob, respectively. We re-
peat the simulations as in the case without an eavesdrop-
per and plot the two Wigner parameters S and S′ as a
function of θ.
In Fig. 8, we see two groups of curves with the same
shape: The simulation result of S′ (blue solid dia-
monds) and the quantum theoretical result of the mod-
ified Wigner parameter (red solid line) agree very well.
The simulation result of S (green solid triangles) and
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FIG. 8: The fidelity F of the sifted key and the two Wigner
parameters S and S′ as a function of θ. Solid circles (red):
Simulation data for F ; Dashed line (blue): Quantum theoreti-
cal result for F (F = 1/2); Solid diamonds (blue): Simulation
data for S′; Solid line (red): Quantum theoretical result for
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FIG. 9: The fidelity F and the two Wigner parameter S and
S′ as a function of ψA for the case ψB = ψA + 90
0. For the
legend, see Fig. 8.
the quantum theoretical result of the Wigner parameter
(blue dashed line) are in excellent agreement too. Both
the data for S and S′ are larger than zero, signaling the
presence of an eavesdropper. As S′ ≥ S, the modified
Wigner parameter clearly is more powerful to disclose
the eavesdropper.
Also shown in Fig. 8 is the fidelity of the sifted key as
a function of θ. The simulation data for F (θ) lies on top
of the theoretical expectation F (θ) = 1/2. It is clear that
the fidelity does not depend on the angle θ. In this case,
the value of the fidelity is about 0.5 due to the choice of
the orientations of Eve’s polarizers.
Next, we take θ = 300 (the optimal values for Ekert’s
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FIG. 10: The fidelity F and the two Wigner parameter S and
S′ as a function of ψA for the case ψB = 90
0. For the legend,
see Fig. 8.
protocol without eavesdropper) to study the dependence
of the fidelity on the settings of Eve’s polarizers. We
consider two different situations: The first one is that
Eve’s polarizers always have perpendicular orientations.
The second one is that we fix one of Eve’s polarizers at
ψB = 90
0, and change the other setting ψA gradually
from 00 to 1800.
The results for the first case are shown in Fig. 9. The
upper curves show the dependence of the fidelity on the
orientation of Eve’s polarizer: The solid circles represent
the simulation data and the dashed line is the theoreti-
cal result according to Malus’ law (F = 1 − 12 sin2 2ψA).
The data in the middle are the simulation results (solid
blue diamonds) and the quantum prediction (red line) of
the Wigner parameter S′. The bottom curves in Fig. 9
show the simulation data and the theoretical result for
the Wigner parameter S. Recall that in order to detect
the presence of an eavesdropper, we must have S > 0 or
S′ > 0 for all ψA. Clearly, there is excellent agreement
between theory and simulation.
The results for the second case are depicted in Fig. 10.
The legend is the same as in Fig. 8. Again, there is ex-
cellent agreement between theory and simulation. From
Fig. 10, it is clear that as S < 0 for some range of an-
gles, using the Wigner parameter S would not allow Alice
and Bob to recognize the existence of the eavesdropper,
whereas if they use S′ they can.
VII. SUMMARY
We present a new approach to simulate quantum cryp-
tography protocols using event-based processes. The
main feature of this approach is that it simulates the
transmission of the individual bits by an event-based pro-
cess. The algorithm that generates the events does not
solve any quantum mechanical equation, thereby circum-
venting the fundamental problems arising from the quan-
12
tum measurement paradox. Our simulation data for the
BB84 and the Ekert protocol are, in all respects, in ex-
cellent agreement with the theoretical expectations. Ex-
tending the simulation method to account for effects such
as depolarization by the medium (fibers,air) and noise is
left for future research.
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APPENDIX A: WIGNER INEQUALITY
We consider a two-particle system (particle A and B)
and a pair of instruments that can measure a two-valued
variable on each particle. The two possible values of the
observed variable are taken to be ±1. Each instrument
has a range of settings. For applications to quantum
cryptography, it is sufficient to consider the special case
for which particle A is detected using one of the two
settings φA,1 and φA,2, and particle B is detected using
the two settings φB,1 = φA,1 and φB,2. Each setting
corresponds to a particular orientation of the apparatus
that measures the polarization. It is assumed that the
two observed results for a pair of particles are always
opposite if the two instruments have the same setting.
The Wigner inequality
P++(φA,1, φB,2)+P++(φA,2, φB,1)−P++(φA,2, φB,2) > 0.
(A1)
is a convenient tool to characterize the correlation be-
tween the results of the measurements on particles A and
B.
Proof: For any combination of settings, for example,
φA,1 and φB,2, the frequency of obtaining +1 on both
sides is given by
F++(φA,1, φB,2) =
N++(φA,1, φB,2)
N
, (A2)
where N++(φA,1, φB,2) denotes the number of events for
which both instruments yield +1 and N is the total num-
ber of events. For a different combination of the settings,
the value of N is assumed to be the same (= ideal exper-
iment assumption). We now show that
N++(φA,1, φB,2) + N++(φA,2, φB,1)
− N++(φA,2, φB,2) > 0, (A3)
holds under the conditions mentioned earlier.
Let us denote by φ
(n)
A,1 and φ
(n)
B,2 the results recorded
for the ith pair using the settings φA,1 and φB,2 Then
N++(φA,1, φB,2) can be written as
N++(φA,1, φB,2) =
N∑
n=1
1 + φ
(n)
A,1
2
1 + φ
(n)
B,2
2
. (A4)
If the settings of the two instruments are such that
φA,1 = φB,1 then we have φ
(n)
A,1 = −φ(n)B,1 and
N++(φA,1, φB,1) =
N∑
n=1
1 + φ
(n)
A,1
2
1 + φ
(n)
B,1
2
= 0. (A5)
Hence, instead of proving Eq. (A3), we can equally well
prove that
N++(φA,1, φB,2) + N++(φA,2, φB,1)−N++(φA,2, φB,2)
− N++(φA,1, φB,1) > 0. (A6)
Substituting Eq. (A4) into Eq. (A6) we obtain
N∑
n=1
[(1 + φ
(n)
A,1)(1 + φ
(n)
B,2) + (1 + φ
(n)
A,2)(1 + φ
(n)
B,1)
−(1 + φ(n)A,2)(1 + φ(n)B,2)− (1 + φ(n)A,1)(1 + φ(n)B,1)]
> 0. (A7)
After simplification, we find
N∑
n=1
(φ
(n)
A,2 − φ(n)A,1)(φ(n)B,2 − φ(n)B,1) > 0. (A8)
Making use of the assumption that φ
(n)
A,1 = −φ(n)B,1, we find
that (φ
(n)
A,2 − φ(n)A,1)t(φ(n)B,2 − φ(n)B,1) > 0. Hence, inequality
Eq. (A8) holds and so do inequalities Eqs. (A6) and (A3).
In the proof of Eq. (A3), it has been assumed that the
observations {φ(n)A,1|n = 1, . . . , N}, {φ(n)A,2|n = 1, . . . , N},
{φ(n)B,1|n = 1, . . . , N}, and {φ(n)B,2|n = 1, . . . , N} do
not depend on whether we record N++(φA,1, φB,2),
N++(φA,2, φB,1), orN++(φA,2, φB,2). In a computer sim-
ulation, it is a simple matter to satisfy this assumption
because we have perfect control over the pseudo-random
numbers that are used to generate the events but in real
experiments, the validity of this assumption cannot be
taken for granted.
Having shown that
F++(φA,1, φB,2) + F++(φA,2, φB,1)
− F++(φA,2, φB,2) > 0, (A9)
and assuming that the observations {φ(n)A,1|n = 1, . . . , N},
{φ(n)A,2|n = 1, . . . , N}, {φ(n)B,1|n = 1, . . . , N}, and
{φ(n)B,2|n = 1, . . . , N} are independent random variables,
we may invoke the law of large numbers29 to argue that
for N → ∞, F++(φA,1, φB,2) → P++(φA,1, φB,2) with
probabilty one. Under these assumptions, the Wigner
inequality Eq. (A1) holds.
APPENDIX B: MODIFIED WIGNER
INEQUALITY
The proof of the modified Wigner inequality
P++(φA,1, φB,2) +P++(φA,2, φB,1) + P−−(φA,1, φB,1)
−P++(φA,2, φB,2) > 0, (B1)
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is very similar to the proof of the original Wigner inequal-
ity. The essential difference is that the modified Wigner
inequality holds if we drop the assumption of perfect an-
ticorrelation.
Adopting the same strategy as in Appendix A, we have
to prove that
N++(φA,1, φB,2) +N++(φA,2, φB,1) +N−−(φA,1, φB,1)
−N++(φA,2, φB,2) > 0. (B2)
Using Eq. (A4), we can rewrite Eq. (B2) as
N∑
n=1
[(1 + φ
(n)
A,1)(1 + φ
(n)
B,2) + (1 + φ
(n)
A,2)(1 + φ
(n)
B,1)
+(1− φ(n)A,1)(1 − φ(n)B,1)− (1 + φ(n)A,2)(1 + φ(n)B,2)]
> 0. (B3)
After simplification, we find
N∑
n=1
[2+φ
(n)
B,2(φ
(n)
A,1−φ(n)A,2)+φ(n)B,1(φ(n)A,1+φ(n)A,2)] > 0. (B4)
It is easy to see that
2 + φ
(n)
B,2(φ
(n)
A,1 − φ(n)A,2) + φ(n)B,1(φ(n)A,1 + φ(n)A,2) > 0, (B5)
always holds. Hence, inequality Eq. (B2) holds. Invoking
the same arguments that were used to replace frequen-
cies by probabilities in Appendix A, it then follows that
inequality Eq. (B1) holds.
APPENDIX C: PROBABILISTIC TREATMENT
If we replace the deterministic sequence of pseudo-
random numbers that we use in the computer simula-
tions by the mathematical concept of logically indepen-
dent random variables, as defined in the (Kolmogorov)
theory of probabilitity29,30, we can readily obtain an-
alytical expressions for the expectation values that we
compute with the simulation model. This then allows us
to analyze the event-based simulation of Ekert’s protocol
analytically. In particular, we will prove that for both
the deterministic model of the polarized beam splitter
(DP) and the probabilistic model of the polarized beam
splitter (PP), the event-by-event simulation reproduces
exactly the two-particle probability Eq. (13) of quantum
theory.
We start by assuming that there exists a probabil-
ity, denoted by P (x1, x2, t1, t2|α, β), to observe the data
{x1, t1} and {x2, t2} for fixed orientations {α, β} on both
observation stations.
As a first step, let us express the probability for observing the data {x1, x2, t1, t2} as an integral over the mutually
exclusive events ξ1, ξ2. According to the rules of probability theory
29,30, we have
P (x1, x2, t1, t2|α, β) = 1
4pi2
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
P (x1, x2, t1, t2|α, β, ξ1, ξ2)P (ξ1, ξ2|α, β)dξ1dξ2, (C1)
where ξ1, ξ2 denotes the two-dimensional unit vector representing the polarization. Starting from the exact represen-
tation Eq. (C1), we may now use the knowledge that in our simulation model (but not necessarily in experiment),
for each event, the values of {x1, x2, t1, t2} are logically independent of each other and that the values of {x1, t1}
({x2, t2}) are also logically independent of β and ξ2 (α and ξ1)). Thus, we may write
P (x1, x2, t1, t2|α, β) = 1
4pi2
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
P (x1, t1|x2, t2, α, β, ξ1, ξ2)P (x2, t2|α, β, ξ1, ξ2)P (ξ1, ξ2|α, β)dξ1dξ2
=
1
4pi2
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
P (x1, t1|α, ξ1)P (x2, t2|β, ξ2)P (ξ1, ξ2|α, β)dξ1dξ2
=
1
4pi2
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
P (x1|α, ξ1)P (t1|α, ξ1)P (x2|β, ξ2)P (t2|β, ξ2)P (ξ1, ξ2|α, β)dξ1dξ2
=
1
4pi2
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
P (x1|α, ξ1)P (t1|α, ξ1)P (x2|β, ξ2)P (t2|β, ξ2)P (ξ1, ξ2)dξ1dξ2, (C2)
where, in the last step, we used the knowledge that in our simulation model, the values of ξ1 and ξ2 are logically
independent of α or β. Note that Eq. (C2) gives the exact probabilistic description of our simulation model.
The mathematical structure of Eq. (C2) is the same as the one that is used in the derivation of Bell’s results.
Thus, if we would continue along the same line as in Bell’s work the model defined by Eq. (C2) cannot produce
the correlation of the singlet state. However, the real factual situation in the experiment is different: The events
are selected using a time window W that the experimenters try to make as small as possible14. Accounting for the
time window, that is multiplying Eq. (C2) by the step function (see Eq. (14)) and integrating over all t1 and t2, the
14
expression for the probability for observing the event (x1, x2) reads
P (x1, x2|α, β) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0 P (x1|α, ξ1)P (x2|β, ξ2)w(α, β, ξ1, ξ2,W )P (ξ1, ξ2)dξ1dξ2∑
x1,x2=±1
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
P (x1|α, ξ1)P (x2|β, ξ2)w(α, β, ξ1, ξ2,W )P (ξ1, ξ2)dξ1dξ2
=
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
P (x1|α, ξ1)P (x2|β, ξ2)w(α, β, ξ1 , ξ2,W )P (ξ1, ξ2)dξ1dξ2∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
w(α, β, ξ1, ξ2,W )P (ξ1, ξ2)dξ1dξ2
, (C3)
where the weight function in our simulation is
w(α, β, ξ1, ξ2,W ) =
1
T1T2
∫ T1
0
dt1
∫ T2
0
dt2Θ(W − |t1 − t2|). (C4)
with T1 = T0| sin 2(α − ξ1)|d and T2 = T0| sin 2(β − ξ2)|d, and the time delays ti are distributed uniformly over the
interval [0, Ti]. The weight function will be less than one unless W is larger than the range of (t1, t2). The integrals
in Eq. (C4) can be worked out analytically, yielding
w(α, β, ξ1, ξ2,W ) =
1
4T1T2
[ T 21 + T
2
2 + 2(T1 + T2)W + (W − T1)|W − T1|+ (W − T2)|W − T2|
−(W − T1 + T2)|W − T1 + T2| − (W + T1 − T2)|W + T1 − T2| ]. (C5)
We now consider the specific case of the PP and the DP model, respectively. The PP reproduces Malus law for a
single polarizer, that is the probability distributions P (x1|α, ξ1) and P (x2|β, ξ2) can be written as
P (x1|α, ξ1) = 1 + x1 cos 2(α− ξ1)
2
,
P (x2|β, ξ2) = 1 + x2 cos 2(β − ξ2)
2
. (C6)
Let us now consider the case of Ekert’s protocol and specialize to the case that the source emits particles with opposite
polarization P (ξ1, ξ2) = δ(ξ1+pi/2− ξ2)P (ξ1) with P (ξ1) being a uniform distribution. If d = 0 and W ≤ T0, we have
w(α, β, ξ1, ξ2,W ) = (2T0 −W )W/T 20 . Likewise, if W > T0, w(α, β, ξ1, ξ2,W ) = 1. Therefore, if W > T0 or d = 0, we
have
P (x1, x2|α, β) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0 P (x1|α, ξ1)P (x2|β, ξ2)P (ξ1, ξ2)dξ1dξ2∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
P (ξ1, ξ2)dξ1dξ2
=
1
8pi
∫ 2pi
0
(1 + x1 cos 2(α− ξ))(1 − x2 cos 2(β − ξ))dξ
=
2− x1x2 cos 2(α− β)
8
, (C7)
and, more specifically,
P++(α, β) =
2− cos 2(α− β)
8
. (C8)
The corresponding expression of the Wigner parameter S reads
S =
2− cos 2θ + cos 4θ
8
. (C9)
From Eqs. (C7), (C8) and (C9), it is clear that if we ignore the time-tag information, the two-particle probability
takes the form of the hidden variable models considered by Bell31, and the event-based model cannot reproduce the
results of quantum theory.
Next, we take into account the time-tag information and, to be able to obtain a closed-form expression, we focus
on the limit W → 0. Then, Eq. (C5) reduces to
w(α, β, ξ1 , ξ2,W → 0) = 2W
max(T1, T2)
+O(W 2). (C10)
15
Inserting Eq. (C10) and P (ξ1, ξ2) = δ(ξ1 + pi/2− ξ2) into Eq. (C3) we find
P (x1, x2|α, β) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0 P (x1|α, ξ1)P (x2|β, ξ2)P (ξ1, ξ2)max(| sin 2(ξ1 − α)|, | sin 2(ξ2 − β)|)−ddξ1dξ2∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
P (ξ1, ξ2)max(| sin 2(ξ1 − α)|, | sin 2(ξ2 − β)|)−ddξ1dξ2
=
1
4
∫ 2pi
0 (1 + x1 cos 2(α− ξ))(1 − x2 cos 2(β − ξ))max(| sin 2(ξ − α)|, | sin 2(ξ − β)|)−ddξ∫ 2pi
0 max(| sin 2(ξ − α)|, | sin 2(ξ − β)|)−ddξ
. (C11)
For d = 4 the integrals in Eq. (C11) can be worked out analytically and the result of this excercise reads
P (x1, x2|α, β) = 1− x1x2 cos 2(α− β)
4
, (C12)
yielding
P++(α, β) =
1
2
sin2(α− β), (C13)
in exact agreement with the expression for a system of two S = 1/2 quantum objects in the singlet state.
The analytical results for the deterministic model of the polarizing beam splitter can be derived in the same manner:
We only have to change the specific expression for the probability distribution of a single polarizer. In the DP model,
the values of x1 and x2 are determined by the sign function. The corresponding probability distributions can be
written as
P (x1|α, ξ1) = Θ (x1 cos 2(α− ξ1)) ,
P (x2|β, ξ2) = Θ (x2 cos 2(β − ξ2)) . (C14)
Now we study the same specific cases as we did earlier. First we consider the case for which W > T0 or d = 0. Then,
we have
P (x1, x2|α, β) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
P (x1|α, ξ1)P (x2|β, ξ2)P (ξ1, ξ2)dξ1dξ2∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
P (ξ1, ξ2)dξ1dξ2
=
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Θ(x1 cos 2(α− ξ))Θ (−x2 cos 2(β − ξ)) dξ, (C15)
yielding
P++(α, β) =
1
2
−
∣∣∣∣ |α− β|pi −
1
2
∣∣∣∣ . (C16)
Second, we consider the limit W → 0 and find that for fixed (α, β), the probability for observing the event (x1, x2) is
given by
P (x1, x2|α, β) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
P (x1|α, ξ1)P (x2|β, ξ2)max(| sin 2(ξ1 − α)|, | sin 2(ξ2 − β)|)−dP (ξ1, ξ2)dξ1dξ2∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0 max(| sin 2(ξ1 − α)|, | sin 2(ξ2 − β)|)−dP (ξ1, ξ2)dξ1dξ2
=
∫ 2pi
0
Θ(x1 cos 2(α− ξ)) Θ (−x2 cos 2(β − ξ))max(| sin 2(ξ − α)|, | sin 2(ξ − β)|)−ddξ∫ 2pi
0 max(| sin 2(ξ − α)|, | sin 2(ξ − β)|)−ddξ
. (C17)
Writing θ = β − α and putting d = 2, we find that the probability P++(α, β) is given by
P++(α, β) =
1
2
∫ 3pi/4+θ/2
3pi/4
| sin 2ξ|−ddξ + ∫ 3pi/4+θ
3pi/4+θ/2
| sin 2(ξ − θ)|−ddξ∫ pi/4+θ/2
θ/2
| sin 2ξ|−ddξ + ∫ pi/2+θ/2
pi/4+θ/2
| sin 2(ξ − θ)|−ddξ
=
1
2
sin2 θ, (C18)
in exact agreement with the expression for a system of two S = 1/2 quantum objects in the singlet state.
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